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This paper investigates equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asym-
metric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competi-
tions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among
others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games,
and apply it to study contests in which a fraction of each competitor’s investment is
sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions
are a special case.
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Many competitions are characterized by asymmetries among competitors. One example
is the competition for rents in a regulated market. Since ﬁrms often compete by engag-
ing in lobbying activities, ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes that aﬀect the cost and eﬀectiveness of
lobbying may lead to asymmetries in competition. Such ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes include
cost of capital and geographic location, which aﬀect lobbying costs, and quality of political
connections, which aﬀect lobbying eﬃcacy. When these attributes vary across ﬁrms, diﬀer-
ent ﬁrms face diﬀerent costs of achieving any desired level of inﬂuence through lobbying.
Similar cost asymmetries result from heterogeneity across competitors in competitions for
promotions and in research and development (R&D) races.
These competitions typically include sunk investments: competitors exert eﬀort, make
outlays, or bear other non-refundable costs in the course of the competition. These invest-
ments are unconditional of the competition’s outcome. In addition, competitors sometimes
commit to investments conditional on winning. For example, in a lobbying setting, a ﬁrm
might commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted a monopoly po-
sition. In some rent-seeking scenarios, “a decision-maker accepts contingent rewards or
bribes oﬀered by interested parties.”1 In an R&D race, a better prototype commits the
ﬁrm to higher expenditures conditional on winning.
This paper investigates equilibrium behavior in a multiprize contest model that is rich
enough to accommodate general asymmetries and both unconditional and conditional in-
vestments. In a contest, players compete for one of several identical prizes. Each player
chooses a “score”, and the players with the highest scores obtain one prize each. In a
lobbying setting, for example, a player’s score represents the inﬂuence he achieves. Condi-
tional on winning or losing, a player’s payoﬀ decreases continuously with his chosen score.
This formulation allows for a wide degree of heterogeneity among players, including diﬀer-
ing production technologies, costs of capital, and abilities. In addition, the diﬀerence in a
player’s payoﬀ between winning and losing may depend on his chosen score. This accom-
modates a combination of unconditional and conditional investments.2 The primitives of
the model are commonly known, capturing players’ knowledge of the asymmetries among
them. This helps interpret players’ payoﬀs as “economic rents”, in contrast to “information
rents” that arise in models of competition with private information.3 Contests are deﬁned
1Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
2It also accommodates player-speciﬁc risk attitudes, and player- and score-dependent valuations for a
prize.
3Examples of such models include Moldovanu & Sela (2001, 2006), Kaplan, Luski, Sela, & Wettstein
1in Section 2. The payoﬀ result of Siegel (2009), who characterizes equilibrium payoﬀsi n
a more general model of contests, provides a closed-form formula for players’ equilibrium
payoﬀs.4
The main result of this paper is a constructive characterization of the unique equilibrium
for a large class of contests. The equilibrium is constructed by an algorithm whose input
is a set of parameters that describe a contest, and whose output is players’ equilibrium
strategies. Once a contest is speciﬁed, each player’s equilibrium performance, expenditures,
and probability of winning a prize can be deduced. The degree of rent dissipation and
level of eﬃciency, relevant for deriving policy implications and contest design, can be
calculated as well.5 None of these can be derived from equilibrium payoﬀs alone. The
framework can also be used to examine how speciﬁc features of competition aﬀect the
competition’s outcome. I consider a class of contests parameterized by the size of the
unconditional component of the investment, and investigate the eﬀe c t so fv a r y i n gt h es i z e
of this component.
A special case of contests is the single-prize and multiprize all-pay auction with complete-
information (henceforth: all-pay auction). The all-pay auction, along with its variants,
has been used extensively to model rent-seeking and lobbying activities (Hillman & Samet
(1987), Hillman & Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock & de Vries (1993), González-Díaz (2007)),
competitions for a monopoly position (Ellingsen (1991)), waiting in line (Clark & Riis
(1998)), sales (Varian (1980)), and R&D races (Dasgupta (1986)), competitions for mul-
tiple prizes (Clark & Riis (1998) and Barut & Kovenock (1998)), the eﬀect of lobbying
caps (Che & Gale (1998, 2006) and Kaplan & Wettstein (2006)), and R&D races with
endogenous prizes (Che & Gale (2003)). In an all-pay auction, all investments are un-
conditional and players’ costs are linear. Contests generalize all-pay auctions by allowing
for non-linear, asymmetric costs, and accommodating both unconditional and conditional
investments.6
Section 3 begins the analysis by considering contests with two players and one prize.
(2002)), and Parreiras & Rubinchik (2006).
4Siegel (2009) allows for players’ payoﬀs to weakly decrease in score, but does not solve for equilibrium.
5Rent dissipation and eﬃciency are context-speciﬁc and depend, for example, on whether expenditures
are productive or wasteful.
6Other models of competition postulate a probabilistic relation between competitors’ eﬀorts and prize
allocation. See the papers by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) and Gordon Tullock (1980). For
a comprehensive treatment of the literature on competitions with sunk investments see Nitzan (1994) and
Konrad (2007).
2In such contests, players compete “head to head” by choosing scores from (essentially) the
same interval. Using this property, I show that there is a unique equilibrium and provide
a closed-form formula for players’ equilibrium strategies.7
The analysis of multiprize contests is much more challenging, because players do not
necessarily compete head to head. That is, diﬀerent players may compete by choosing
scores from diﬀerent intervals. Moreover, when players are suﬃciently heterogeneous, a
player may choose scores from multiple intervals. This is demonstrated in the example of
Figures 2 and 3.
To overcome these diﬃculties, I identify key properties of any “well-behaved” equilib-
rium of an (m +1 )-player contest for m prizes. These properties, detailed in Section 3.1,
imply that under a mild technical condition players’ equilibrium strategies can be uniquely
constructed by considering an appropriate “supply function” for the hazard rates of play-
ers’ strategies as a function of score.8 Section 3.2 provides an algorithm that does this.
Using the fact that a well-behaved equilibrium exists, Section 3.3 rules out the existence
of additional equilibria. This step is not straightforward, since little can be assumed about
the structure of equilibria that are not well behaved, if they exist.
The equilibrium uniqueness result for (m+1)-player contests implies that contests with
n>mplayers have at most one equilibrium in which precisely m +1players participate.
The participation result of Siegel (2009) provides a suﬃcient condition for precisely m+1
players to participate in any equilibrium. Therefore, the algorithm constructs the unique
equilibrium for a large class of multiplayer, multiprize contests.
Section 4 applies these results to investigate the eﬀects of conditional investments when
competitors compete by using the same underlying production technology. In this class
of simple contests, a positive fraction α ≤ 1 of each competitor’s costs is sunk, and the
remaining 1 − α is paid only by the winners of the m ≥ 1 prizes. Competitors may
diﬀer in how eﬃciently they employ the common underlying technology. This diﬀerence in
eﬃciency is captured by player-speciﬁcc o s tc o e ﬃcients, which are multiplied by a common
cost function representing the common production technology. Competitors may also diﬀer
in their valuations for a prize.
I show that simple contests have a unique equilibrium, in which every player chooses a
score from an interval. Moreover, after normalizing each player’s eﬃciency by dividing his
7This result generalizes those of Kaplan & Wettstein (2006) and Che & Gale (2006), who considered
two-player contests with ordered cost functions and no conditional investments.
8The construction also uses knowledge of players’ equilibrium payoﬀs, which are characterized in Siegel
(2009).
3cost coeﬃcient by his valuation for a prize, I show that the equilibrium strategies of more
eﬃcient players ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate those of less eﬃcient players, and that
more eﬃcient players win prizes more often than less eﬃcient players. As α approaches
0,t h em o s te ﬃcient players obtain a prize with near certainty. When players diﬀer only
in their valuations for a prize, as α approaches 0 the allocation of prizes becomes eﬃcient
and expenditures are maximized.
The limit of the equilibria as α approaches 0 is an equilibrium of the corresponding
“discriminatory-price auction,” in which all investments are conditional on winning. In
this equilibrium, no player chooses weakly dominated strategies with positive probability,
and the equilibrium is robust to the tie-breaking rule. This provides a selection criterion
among the continuum of equilibria of the discriminatory-price auction, which are not payoﬀ
equivalent. A special case is the complete-information ﬁrst-price auction.
When α =1 , all investments are unconditional. I provide a closed-form formula for
players’ equilibrium strategies in this case. If, in addition, the common production tech-
nology is linear, we have a multiprize all-pay auction.9
Appendix A contains an example of an equilibrium that is not well-behaved. Appendix
B contains proofs of results from Section 3. Appendix C contains proofs of results from
Section 4.
2 The Model
In a contest, n players compete for m homogeneous prizes, 0 <m<n .T h es e to fp l a y e r s
{1,...,n} is denoted by N. Players compete by each choosing a score, simultaneously and
independently. Player i chooses a score si ∈ Si =[ 0 ,∞).E a c h o f t h e m players with
the highest scores wins one prize. In case of a relevant tie, any procedure may be used to
allocate the tie-related prizes among the tied players.
Given scores s =( s1,...,s n),o n ef o re a c hp l a y e r ,player i’s payoﬀ is
ui (s)=Pi (s)vi (si) − (1 − Pi (s))ci (si)
where vi : Si → R is player i’s valuation for winning, ci : Si → R is player i’s cost of
9This result generalizes and corrects that of Clark & Riis (1998). They constructed an equilibrium for
the multiprize all-pay auction and claimed it was unique. Their proof of uniqueness relied on showing that
in any equilibrium the best response set of each player is an interval. Their proof of this latter claim was
incorrect.
4losing,a n dPi : ×j∈NSj → [0,1] is player i’s probability of winning,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes
Pi (s)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if sj >s i for m or more players j 6= i
1 if sj <s i for N − m or more players j 6= i




Note that a player’s probability of winning depends on all players’ scores, but his valuation
for winning and cost of losing depend only on his chosen score. The primitives of the
contest are commonly known.
I consider contests that meet the following Assumptions B1-B3.
B1 vi and −ci are continuous and strictly decreasing.
B2 vi (0) > 0 and limsi→∞vi (si) <c i (0) = 0.
Assumption B2 says that prizes are valuable, and that suﬃciently high investments
are prohibitively costly. Assumption B1 captures the all-pay component of contests. It is
not satisﬁed by complete-information ﬁrst-price auctions, for example, since a player pays
nothing if he loses, so ci ≡ 0. But assumption B1 is satisﬁed when an all-pay element
is introduced, e.g., when every bidder pays some positive fraction of his bid whether he
wins or not, and only the winner pays the balance of his bid. Assumptions B1 and B2 are
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Figure 1: Assumptions B1 and B2
5As Figure 1 shows, the payoﬀ diﬀerence between winning and losing may depend on the
player’s chosen score. This accommodates a combination of unconditional and conditional
investments, as shown in Section 4. A non-constant payoﬀ diﬀerence can also be used to
model diﬀerent risk attitudes and prizes of varying values.
In a separable contest,t h i sp a y o ﬀ diﬀerence is constant, so vi (si)=Vi − ci (si) and
ui (s)=Pi (s)Vi − ci (si),w h e r eVi = vi (0) > 0.T h ev a l u eVi can be thought of as player
i’s valuation for a prize, which does not depend on his chosen score, and ci (si) can be
thought of as player i’s cost of choosing score si, which does not depend on whether he
wins or loses. If a given score can be achieved in diﬀerent ways, ci (si) corresponds to
the least costly way of achieving it. All investments are unconditional, and players are
risk neutral. Figure 2 below depicts a separable contest with non-linear costs. Separable
contests with linear costs are single- and multiprize complete-information all-pay auctions
(Hillman & Samet (1987), Hillman & Riley (1989), Clark & Riis (1998)).10
Assumption B3, which completes the description of contests, uses the following deﬁni-
tion.
Deﬁnition 1 (i) Player i’s reach ri is the score at which his valuation for winning is 0.
That is, ri = v
−1
i (0). Re-index players in (any) decreasing order of their reach, so that
r1 ≥ r2 ≥ ...≥ rn.
(ii) Player m +1is the marginal player.
(iii) The threshold T of the contest is the reach of the marginal player: T = rm+1.
Assumption B3 states that the reach of the marginal player is diﬀerent from that of
the other players.
B3 Only the marginal player’s reach is equal to the threshold, so ri 6= T for every player
i 6= m +1 .
In a separable contest, a player’s reach is the score whose cost is the player’s valuation
for a prize. For example, in an all-pay auction a player’s reach is his valuation for a prize,
so Assumption B3 is met if the marginal player’s valuation for a prize is diﬀerent from
those of the other players.
10Formally, vi (si)=Vi − si,c i (si)=si, and ties are resolved by randomizing uniformly, where Vi is
bidder i’s valuation for a prize.
6The model of contests described here is a special case of Siegel’s (2009) all-pay contest
model. The main diﬀerence is that he allows for weakly decreasing vi and −ci.11
2.1 Existing Results
This subsection lists four results, Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 which I
use in solving for equilibrium. They are immediate corollaries of results in Siegel (2009).12
The ﬁrst result characterizes players’ equilibrium payoﬀs (without solving for equilibrium),
and uses the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 Players i’s power wi is his valuation for winning at the threshold. That is,
wi = vi (T). In particular, the marginal player’s power is 0.
Assumptions B1 and B3 imply that only the marginal player has power 0.I na na l l - p a y
auction, for example, a player’s power is equal to his valuation for a prize less that of the
marginal player.
Theorem 1 In any equilibrium of a contest, the expected payoﬀ of every player equals the
maximum of his power and 0.
In addition to giving a closed-form formula for players’ equilibrium payoﬀs, Theorem 1
shows that players 1,...,mhave strictly positive expected payoﬀs, and players m+1,...,n
have expected payoﬀso f0.I ta l s os h o w st h a tap l a y e r ’ se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ does not depend
on his cost of losing.
Ap l a y e rparticipates in an equilibrium of a contest if with strictly positive probability he
chooses scores associated with strictly positive costs of losing. The second result provides
as u ﬃcient condition for players m +2 ,...,nnot to participate in any equilibrium.
Theorem 2 If the normalized costs of losing and valuations for winning for the marginal







for all x ≥ 0 such that ci (x) > 0
11Instead of Assumptions B1-B3, Siegel (2009) makes three assumptions (A1-A3), and speciﬁes two
Generic Conditions (Cost Condition and Power Condition) on players’ valuations for winning and costs of
losing. Assumptions B1 and B2 imply his Assumptions A1-A3 and Cost Condition, and Assumptions B1
and B3 imply his Power Condition. In particular, a contest here is a generic contest of Siegel (2009).
12The results follow, respectively, from Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Corollary 1, and Theorem 1, Lemma 1,







for all x ≥ 0
then player i does not participate in any equilibrium. In particular, if these conditions hold
for all players m +2 ,...,n, then in any equilibrium only the m +1players 1,...,m+1
may participate.
The third result states that an equilibrium always exists.
Lemma 1 Every contest has a Nash equilibrium.
The fourth result enumerates four properties of any equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium of a contest, (1) no score in (0,T) is chosen with strictly
positive probability by any player, (2) every score in (0,T) is a best response for at least
two players, (3) no score higher than T is a best response for any player, and (4) players
1,...,m+1participate.
3 Solving for Equilibrium
A player’s (mixed) strategy is a probability distribution over [0,∞), and an equilibrium is a
proﬁle of strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy assigns probability
1 to the player’s best-responses given the other players’ strategies. I describe a strategy of
player i by a cumulative distribution function (CDF) Gi,w h i c hf o re v e r yx ≥ 0 speciﬁes
the probability Gi (x) that player i chooses a score lower or equal to x. A key step in
solving for equilibrium is identifying players’ best-response sets, or strategy supports.
Consider ﬁrst the relatively simple case of two players and one prize. Part (2) of Lemma
2 shows that the players must behave in a way that makes every positive score up to the
threshold a best response for both of them. That both players have interval best-response
sets pins down the unique equilibrium even without knowing players’ payoﬀs.









13When there are more than two players, since players 1 and 2 participate in any equilibrium (part (4) of
Lemma 2), a single-prize contest has at most one equilibrium in which two players participate. Example 3
in Siegel (2009) shows that a single-prize contest may have multiple equilibria when more than two players
participate.
8Proof. It is straightforward to verify that (G1,G 2) is an equilibrium. For uniqueness,
consider some equilibrium of the contest. By part (2) of Lemma 2, both players are
indiﬀerent among all scores in (0,T). Moreover, no player can have an atom at T, otherwise
the other player would not have best responses slightly below T, contradicting part (2) of








some d1 and d2, and neither CDF can reach 1 before T. By part (3) of Lemma 2, the
C D F so fb o t hp l a y e r sm u s tr e a c h1a te x a c t l yT. Consequently, d1 = v1 (T)=w1 and
d2 = v2 (T)=0 , so the equilibrium coincides with (G1,G 2).
Section 4.1 below provides an application of this result to certain non-separable contests.
Applied to separable contests, Theorem 3 extends the results of Kaplan & Wettstein (2006)
and Che & Gale (2006), who considered two-player separable contests with ordered cost
functions.
I now turn to multiprize contests. In this case, part (4) of Lemma 2 shows that more
than two players participate in any equilibrium. This raises the possibility that diﬀerent
players may compete on diﬀerent sets of scores. Moreover, players may have non-interval
best-response sets. This is indeed the case when players have relative cost advantages at
diﬀerent scores. In fact, players’ behavior can be quite “pathological”.14
The challenge is therefore to (1) guarantee the existence of and solve for a “well-
behaved” equilibrium and (2) rule out “pathological” equilibria. I do both for a large
class of contests, which nests single- and multiprize all-pay auctions. To this end, I con-
sider regular contests, which are contests that meet the following regularity condition.
R The valuations for winning and costs of losing of players 1,...,m+1are piecewise
analytical on [0,T].15.
Consider the three-player, two-prize, separable regular contest depicted in Figure 2.16
Its unique equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3, drawn as cumulative probability distribu-
tions. In the equilibrium, the best-response set of player 2 is (0,x 1] ∪ [x2,1],a n dt h a to f
player 3 is [0,x 3] ∪ [x4,1].E a c h p l a y e r i s d e ﬁned as being “active” on his best-response
14Appendix A depicts an equilibrium in which a player’s best-response set is the Cantor set.
15A function f is piecewise analytical on [0,T] if [0,T] can be divided into a ﬁnite number of closed
intervals such that the restriction of f to each interval is analytical. Analytical functions include polynomi-
als, the exponent function, trigonometric functions, and power functions. Sums, products, compositions,
reciprocals, and derivatives of analytical functions are analytical (see, for example, Chapman (2002)).
16Players’ cost functions are given in Appendix B.7.
9set, with the possible inclusion of 0.17 As Figure 3 shows, diﬀerent players compete on
diﬀerent sets of scores.
The algorithm described in Section 3.2 constructs the equilibrium by identifying the
players active on each interval (denoted in curly brackets), and the “switching points”
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Figure 2: Player’s costs, reaches, and powers
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Figure 3: The unique equilibrium
17In the equilibria of Baye et al. (1993), who considered a single-prize all-pay auction that violates
Assumption B3, a player’s best-response set may be the union of 0 and a single interval whose lower
endpoint is strictly positive. All such equilibria disappear when players’ valuations are perturbed slightly
to produce unique players with the ﬁrst- and second-highest valuations (so that Assumption B3 holds).
This leaves a single equilibrium, in which the best-response set of each player is an interval (or the singleton
0). A similar perturbation produces a single equilibrium, in which the best-response set of each player is an
interval, in González-Díaz (2007). In contrast, the non-interval property that arises here is “fundamental”
in nature: it is robust to perturbations in the contest’s speciﬁcation, and, moreover, a player’s best-response
set may consist of several disjoint intervals of positive length.
10For such a construction to be possible, the equilibrium must be “well-behaved”, in
that for every x<Tthe set of players active immediately to the right of x must remain
c o n s t a n t .T h i si sf o r m a l i z e db yt h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 An equilibrium is constructible if for every score x<T there exists some
¯ x>xs u c ht h a tf o re a c hp l a y e re i t h e re v e r ys c o r ei n(x, ¯ x) is a best response, or no score in
(x, ¯ x) is a best response. I refer to equilibria that are not constructible as non-constructible.
The algorithm solves for a constructible equilibrium G =( G1,...,G m+1) of an (m +1 ) -
player regular contest. This is done by using three properties of constructible equilibria
to generate a proﬁle of CDFs, and then showing that these CDFs form a constructible
equilibrium. The three properties are derived in Section 3.1. I begin with an informal
overview of these properties and the algorithm.
The ﬁrst property is that only player m+1has an atom at 0, and the size of the atom
is determined by players’ payoﬀs (which are given by Theorem 1). This determines G(0).
The second property is that for every x<Tthe value of G on some right-neighborhood
of x can be uniquely determined from G(x) and the set of players active immediately to
the right of x. This value coincides with the solution to a set of simultaneous equations
derived from the condition that active players obtain their equilibrium payoﬀ and inactive
players’ CDFs do not increase. The third property is that the set of players active to the
right of x<Tis uniquely determined by G(x),a n dt h eﬁr s ts w i t c h i n gp o i n ta b o v ex can
be uniquely determined as well. This is seen by showing that G(x), players’ valuations for
winning and costs of losing in a right-neighborhood of x, and players’ payoﬀsj o i n t l yd e ﬁne
a “supply function” for hazard rates whose unique positive ﬁxed point identiﬁes the set of
players active to the right of x. This uses Condition R. The ﬁrst switching point above x
is the ﬁrst point that violates one of the following two equilibrium conditions when G is
deﬁned to the right of x as described in the second property above. First, no player should
be able to obtain more than his equilibrium payoﬀ. Thus, an inactive player becomes active
when other players’ CDFs, and therefore his probability of winning, become suﬃciently
high. Second, players’ CDFs must be non-decreasing. Thus, an active player becomes
inactive if his CDF would otherwise decrease.
Combining these three properties, the algorithm constructs G by proceeding from 0 to
T. Beginning at 0, the set of active players to the right of 0 is determined from G(0),a n d
G is deﬁned up to and including the ﬁrst switching point above 0. The process is repeated
until T is reached. I show that the number of switching points that result is ﬁnite, and
the resulting G is indeed a constructible equilibrium. In the course of the construction,
a player may become active and inactive several times, leading to non-interval supports.
11This is what happens to players 2 and 3 in the equilibrium of Figure 3. The construction of
this equilibrium is described at the end of Section 3.2 as an application of the algorithm.18
Because the local conditions combined with players’ payoﬀs uniquely determine G at
every point, the algorithm constructs the unique constructible equilibrium. Theorem 5
in Section 3.3 rules out the existence of non-constructible equilibria using the fact that a
constructible equilibrium exists. The remainder of Section 3.3 considers implications for
n-player contests.
3.1 Properties of a Constructible Equilibrium
Suppose that G is a constructible equilibrium of an (m +1 ) -player regular contest. The
value of G at 0 is given by the following lemma, which doesn’t rely on constructibility.
Lemma 3 Gi (0) = 0 for i<m+1 ,a n dGm+1 (0) = mini≤m
wi
vi(0) < 1.
The proofs of this and other results in this section are in Appendix B.
Now, choose y in (0,T) and suppose y is a best response for player i. Since there are
m+1players and the powers of players 1,...m+1are non-negative, payoﬀse q u a lp o w e r s
(Theorem 1). Thus, y is a best response for player i if and only if
Pi (y)vi (y) − (1 − Pi (y))ci (y)=wi,
where Pi (y) is the probability that player i wins a prize when other players choose scores
according to G.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
1 − Pi (y)=1−
wi + ci (y)
vi (y)+ci (y)
. (1)
Since there are m prizes and G is continuous at y>0 (Part (1) of Lemma 2), the
expression on on left-hand side of Equation (1) equals Πj∈N\{i} (1 − Gj (y)), i.e., the prob-
ability that all other players choose scores higher than y.S i n c evi (y)+ci (y) is the gain
from winning relative to losing, I refer to the right-hand side of Equation (1) as player i’s
normalized excess payoﬀ at y and denote it by qi (y),
qi (y)=1−
wi + ci (y)
vi (y)+ci (y)
=
vi (y) − vi (T)
vi (y)+ci (y)
> 0.
18A contest can be thought of as a silent game of timing, in which every player i chooses a quitting time
si,a n de a c ho ft h em players who are the last to quit wins a prize. A region on which a player is not
active is an interval of times at which the player never quits.
12Thus,
Πj∈N\{i} (1 − Gj (y)) = qi (y) (2)
if and only if y in (0,T) is a best response for player i.
Let x be a score in [0,T). Considering scores y slightly higher than x, I denote the set
of players for whom all such scores are best responses by A+ (x),a n dr e f e rt oi ta st h es e t
of players active to the right of x:
A
+ (x)={i ∈ N : Equation (2) holds for all y ∈ (x,z) for some z>x }.
That A+ (x) is well deﬁned follows from constructibility of G.L e t




+ (x) for all y ∈ [x,z)
ª
.
I refer to ¯ x as the ﬁrst switching point above x, i.e., the ﬁrst score higher than x at which
t h es e to fp l a y e r sa c t i v et ot h er i g h to fx changes.
I now show that G(x) and A+ (x) determine the value of G on [x, ¯ x]. By constructibility
and continuity of G,i fj/ ∈ A+ (x),t h e nGj does not increase on [x, ¯ x].T h u s ,g i v e nG(x)
and A+ (x), Equation (2) for players j ∈ A+ (x) and score y in (x, ¯ x]\T l e a d st oas y s t e m
of |A+ (x)| equations (where |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A)i n|A+ (x)| unknowns
(1 − Gj (y)). The unique solution is given by the following lemma.19
Lemma 4 Let D = Πj6∈A+(x) (1 − Gj (x)) (if A+ (x)=N,t h e nD =1 ). For every y in












if i ∈ A+ (x)
Gi (x) if i/ ∈ A+ (x)
(3)
and Gi (T)=1 .
I now show that G(x) uniquely determines A+ (x), and then show that ¯ x is uniquely
determined as well. For every x in [0,T),l e t
A(x)={i ∈ N : Equation (2) holds with x in place of y}.( 4 )
I refer to A(x) as the set of players active at x.F o r a n y x in (0,T),t h e s ea r et h e
players for whom x is a best response. By right-continuity of qi and G at every xin [0,T),
A+ (x) ⊆ A(x). This inclusion provides an upper bound on A+ (x): players who are active
19|A+ (x)| ≥ 2 is guaranteed by part (2) of Lemma 2.
13to the right of x must be active at x. But this bound is not tight: A+ (x) may be a strict
subset of A(x).20 Nevertheless, A(x) uniquely determines A+ (x). To see this, rewrite
Equation (2) in terms of marginal percentage changes as follows.
Denote by εi (y)=−
q0
i(y)
qi(y) > 0 player i’s semi-elasticity at y<T ,a n db yhj (y)=
−
(1−Gj(y))0
1−Gj(y) player j’s hazard rate at y, where all derivatives denote right-derivatives.21 For
i in A+ (x), by Equation (2), player i’s normalized excess payoﬀ at y>xequals the product
of the other players’ probabilities of choosing scores higher than y,f o ry suﬃciently close
to x. Thus, taking natural logs and diﬀerentiating Equation (2), εi (y) equals the sum
P
j∈N\{i} hj (y) of the other players’ hazard rates at y. Since players who are not in A+ (x)
have hazard rates of 0 at y,w eh a v e
for every i in A
+ (x), εi (y)=
X
j∈A+(x)\{i}
hj (y).( 5 )
By right-continuity, Equation (5) holds at y = x. In addition, since no player can
obtain more than his power on a right-neighborhood of x,w eh a v e
for every i in A(x), εi (x) ≥
X
j∈A+(x)\{i}
hj (x) with equality for i ∈ A
+ (x).( 6 )
Letting H (x)=
P
j∈A+(x) hj (x) and noting that hi (x) > 0 implies that player i is in
A+ (x), Equation (5) and Inequality (6) can be combined as
∀i ∈ A(x):hi (x)=m a x{H (x) − εi (x),0}.( 7 )
Equation (7) pins down players’ hazard rates at x. To see this, think of the right-hand
side of Equation (7) with H in place of H (x) as player i’s “supply curve” of “hazard rate”
as a function of “price” H.T h e n Sx (H)=
P
i∈A(x) max{H − εi (x),0} is the aggregate
supply of hazard rates at x given H. In equilibrium, by adding up Equation (7) for i ∈ A(x)
and noting that hj (x)=0for j ∈ A(x)\A+ (x), the aggregate hazard rates supplied by
players in A(x) must equal the actual aggregate hazard rate H (x).T h u s , H (x) must
satisfy Sx (H (x)) = H (x). To determine H (x) from Sx,n o t et h a tSx is a piecewise linear
function, whose slope increases by 1 every time H exceeds the semi-elasticity of a player in
20This is the case at x1 in Figure 3, since A(x1)={1,2,3} and A+ (x1)={1,3}. The correspondence
x ⇒ A(x) can be thought of as “right upper hemi-continuous”. In general, however, it is not “right lower
hemi-continuous”.
21By Condition R, and since G is given by Equation (3), qi and G are right-continuously diﬀerentiable.
q0
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i (y)
Positive z }| {
(ci (y)+vi (T))+
Positive z }| {
c0
i (y)
Negative z }| {
(vi (T) − vi (y))
(vi(y)+ci(y))2
14A(x). Since all semi-elasticities are positive and |A(x)| ≥ 2,22 S0
x(0) = 0 and H (x) > 0.
So, Sx is a convex function that starts below the diagonal and reaches a slope of at least 2.
Therefore, it intersects the diagonal precisely once above 0,a tH (x) (see Figure 4 below).
Since players with positive hazard rates at x are in A+ (x),i fεi (x) <H(x) for a player
i ∈ A(x),t h e ni ∈ A+ (x).23 Since a player l ∈ A(x) must obtain his power immediately
to the right of x to be in A+ (x),i fεl (x) >H (x),t h e nl/ ∈ A+ (x). T h i si sd e p i c t e d
in Figure 4: A(x)={i,j,l},a n dA+ (x)={i,j},s i n c eεi (x) <H(x),ε j (x) <H(x),
and εl (x) >H(x).A l s o ,S0













εl(x) εi(x) εj(x) H(x) εk(x)
hj(x)
hi(x)
Figure 4: The function Sx and its ﬁxed point H (x)
A complication arises when εi (x)=H (x) for a player i in A(x). The correct assign-
ment of such a player is important, since his semi-elasticity slightly above x may diﬀer
from the aggregate hazard rate, so he may or may not be active to the right of x,w h i c h
in turn inﬂuences the aggregate hazard rate. That this assignment can be determined
unambiguously follows from the assumption of piecewise analytical costs (Condition R).
This is shown in Lemma 7 in Appendix B. The lemma gives a closed-form formula for
H (x) and provides the following procedure for deciding whether a player i in A(x) is in
A+ (x).C o m p a r eεi (x) and H (x); if they are equal, compare their ﬁrst right-derivatives,
etc. (This will “generically” stop at the ﬁrst derivatives.) The lowest order derivatives of
εi (x) and H (x) that diﬀer determine whether player i is in A+ (x) (< means the player is
in A+ (x), > means the player is not in A+ (x)). If all derivatives are equal, then player i
is in A+ (x).
22Part (2) of Lemma 2.
23By deﬁnition of H (x) as the ﬁxed point of Sx (H), there are at least two such players, so |A+ (x)| ≥ 2.
15Now consider the ﬁrst switching point ¯ x<Tabove x.T h i si st h eﬁrst score for which
A+ (x) 6= A+ (¯ x).I fj ∈ A+ (¯ x)\A+ (x),t h e nj ∈ A(¯ x)\A+ (x),s oj obtains his power at
¯ x. If, on the other hand, j ∈ A+ (x)\A+ (¯ x),t h e nhj (¯ x)=0 . Thus, to identify ¯ x consider
the ﬁrst point y>xsuch that Equation (2) holds for a player j/ ∈ A+ (x),o rhj (y)=0for
ap l a y e rj ∈ A+ (x),o ry is a concatenation point of the cost function of a player in A+ (x)
(recall that costs are piecewise-deﬁned functions), or y = T.I fy 6= T, using Equation (4)
determine A(y) from G(y),a n du s eH (y) to determine A+ (y) from A(y) as described
above. If A+ (y) 6= A+ (x),t h e ny is the switching point ¯ x.I f A+ (y)=A+ (x),t h e n
y is not a true switching point, and the search continues above y for the next candidate
switching point. This can only repeat a ﬁnite number of times before ¯ x is identiﬁed.24
3.2 The Algorithm
The properties derived in the Section 3.1 suggest the following algorithm for constructing
a candidate constructible equilibrium G on [0,T].D e ﬁne G(0) as in Lemma 3 and set
x =0 .D e ﬁne A(x) from G(x) using Equation (4). Determine A+ (x) from A(x) via Sx
and its unique ﬁxed point H (x) as described above. Identify ¯ x,t h eﬁrst switching point
higher than x, as described above. Deﬁne G on [x, ¯ x] using Equation (3). If ¯ x 6= T,s e t
x =¯ x and continue.
For every score x in (0,T) which has been reached in this process, the following points
are true.
1. G is continuous and non-decreasing on (0,x) by construction.
2.
¡




Πj∈N\{i} (1 − Gj (x))
¢
ci (x) ≤ wi,w i t he q u a l i t y
if hi (x) > 0,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n .
3. G(x) ∈ (0,1). This follows from the continuity and monotonicity of G up to y,s i n c e
G(0) < 1 (Lemma 3), and if Gi (x) ≥ 1,t h e ne v e r yp l a y e rj 6= i would obtain strictly
more than his power by choosing a score slightly lower than x, violating point 2.
4. |A(x)| ≥ 2. This can be seen by induction on the number of switching points up to
x,s i n c e( i )|A(0)| ≥ 2 (A(0) =
n




), (ii) if |A(y)| ≥ 2
then |A+ (y)| ≥ 2 for any y<x(see footnote 23), and (iii) A+ (y) ⊆ A(¯ y) for any
y<x , by construction.
24Finiteness can be shown using analyticity, similarly to the proof of Lemma 7.
16Points 3 and 4 show that the algorithm can proceed from any score y<Tthat has
been reached. To show that the algorithm terminates, it suﬃces to show that the number
of switching points is ﬁnite.
Lemma 5 The number of switching points in [0,T] identiﬁed by the algorithm is ﬁnite.
In addition, A(x)=N for all x suﬃciently close to T.
The construction will therefore reach T by applying the steps above a ﬁnite number of
times. Thus, the output G is characterized by a partition into a ﬁnite number of intervals
of positive length, on the interior of which the set of active players remains constant. The
value of G on each interval is given by Equation (3). To show that G is an equilibrium, it
remains to show that Gi (T)=1 .
Lemma 6 For every player i, limx→T Gi (x)=Gi (T)=1 .
Theorem 4 G is a constructible equilibrium, which is continuous above 0.
Proof. G is a proﬁle of probability distribution functions, since it is right-continuous on
[0,T], weakly increasing, and G(T)=1(point 1 above and Lemma 6). It is continuous
above 0 (point 1 above and Lemma 6). No player can obtain more than his power, and Gi
is strictly increasing only where player i obtains precisely his power (point 2 above). Thus,
best responses are chosen with probability 1,s oG is an equilibrium. By the construction
procedure, G is constructible (for every x<T, every score in (x, ¯ x) is a best response for
players in A+ (x) and no score in (x, ¯ x) is a best response for players in N\A+ (x)).
For an illustration, consider the supply function Sx and its positive ﬁxed point H (x)
in the context of Figure 3 above. A(0) = A+ (0) = {2,3}.A s x increases from 0 to T,
the set of active players changes. At the switching point x1, player 1 becomes active since
he obtains his power. This changes Sx and H (x) discontinuously. As a result, H (x1)
falls below player 2’s hazard rate, and he becomes inactive immediately above x1.A tx2,
player 2 rejoins the set of active players, and all three players are active up to x3.T h u s ,
the addition of an active player may or may not cause another to become inactive. At x3,
player 3’s hazard rate reaches 0, and he becomes inactive immediately above x3.P l a y e r
3 rejoins the set of active players at x4, and all three players remain active up to the
threshold.25
25Bulow & Levin (2006) constructed the equilibrium of a game in which players have linear costs and
compete for heterogeneous prizes. Their construction proceeds from the top, without ﬁrst identifying
players’ equilibrium payoﬀs. This is possible because each player’s best-response set is an interval and
players’ marginal costs are identical. Such a procedure does not work here, since the set of players active
to the left of x cannot be uniquely determined from G(x) and players’ payoﬀs using local conditions.
173.3 Equilibrium Uniqueness and Implications
Since the value of G at 0, the switching points, and the corresponding sets of active players
are uniquely determined, the algorithm constructs the unique constructible equilibrium of
an (m +1 )-player regular contest. Theorem 5 rules out the existence of non-constructible
equilibria, using the fact that a constructible equilibrium exists.26
Theorem 5 If an (m +1 ) -player contest, regular or not, has a constructible equilibrium,
then that is the unique equilibrium of the contest.
T h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e ms u m m a r i z e st h er e s u l t sf o r( m +1 )-player regular contests.
Theorem 6 An (m +1 ) -player regular contest has a unique equilibrium, which is con-
structible. It is characterized by a partition of [0,T] into a ﬁnite number of closed intervals
with disjoint interiors of positive length, such that the set of active players is constant
on the interior of each interval. Thus, each player’s best-response set is a ﬁnite union of
intervals. All players are active on the last interval.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5, Theorem 4, and Theorem 5.
Appendix A shows that when players’ costs are not piecewise analytical, so the contest
is not regular, non-constructible equilibria may exist.
I now turn to regular contests with any number of players.
Theorem 7 Regular contests have at most one equilibrium in which precisely m+1 players
participate. The candidate for this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the reduced
contest with players 1,...,m+1 . It is an equilibrium of the original contest if and only
if players m +2 ,...,ncannot obtain strictly positive payoﬀs by participating. If they can,
then in every equilibrium at least m +2players participate.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 6 and part (4) of Lemma 2.
In some regular contests, players m+2,...,ndo not participate in any equilibrium. A
suﬃcient condition is given by Theorem 2. For such contests, a much stronger result can
be stated.
26Clark & Riis (1998) and, to the best of my reading, Bulow & Levin (2006), who constructed equilibria
of similar games with a continuum of pure strategies in which more than two players participate, did not
rule out the existence of equilibria that are not constructible. Such equilibria do not arise in Baye et al.
(1996), but are not ruled out in the setting of González-Díaz (2007), who extends the analysis of Baye et
al. (1996) to more general costs.
18Theorem 8 Regular contests in which players m+2,...,ndo not participate in any equi-
librium have a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, players m +2 ,...,nchoose 0 with
certainty, and players 1,...,m+1 behave as in the unique equilibrium of the reduced contest
with players 1,...,m+1.As u ﬃcient condition for this is that the conditions of Theorem
2 hold for every player m +2 ,...,n.
Proof. By Theorem 6, the only candidate equilibrium is the one described in the state-
ment of the theorem. This is an equilibrium of the contest, because every contest has an
equilibrium (Lemma 1).
Note that the conditions of Theorem 2 do not place any restrictions on how the valua-
tions for winning and costs of losing relate among players N\{m +1 }. Thus, Theorem 8
applies to a wide class of contests.
4S i m p l e C o n t e s t s
This section studies a class of contests that allows for a combination of unconditional
and conditional investments, while accommodating a limited degree of asymmetry among
players. All-pay auctions are a special case. I show that contests in this class have a
unique equilibrium, in which every player’s best response set is an interval. I also explore
the connection between the unconditional component of the investment and how eﬃciently
prizes are allocated.
Suppose that all players share a common underlying technology, captured by a strictly
increasing function c(·) with c(0) = 0, but may diﬀer in how well they employ this technol-
ogy. This diﬀerence is captured by every player i’s idiosyncratic cost coeﬃcient γi > 0.27
Af r a c t i o nα in (0,1] of the cost is sunk. The remainder of the cost, 1 − α,i sb o r n eo n l y
if the player wins a prize. For every player i, we therefore have vi (si)=Vi − γic(si) and
ci = αγic(si), where Vi > 0 is player i’s valuation for a prize. A contest in this family is
called a simple contest ( s e eF i g u r e5b e l o w ) . 28 When α =1 , all investments are sunk.29 If,
27For example, ﬁrms competing in an R&D race may have access to a similar technology, but may diﬀer
in the skill and innovativeness of their workers.
28Other contests can also accommodate player- and score-speciﬁcf r a c t i o n sαi (si) and valuations Vi (si).
Of course, the more general is the class of contests considered, the weaker are the conclusions regarding
players’ behavior in the unique equilibrium speciﬁed by the algorithm of Section 3.2.
29The contest is then similar to the one in Moldovanu & Sela (2001). The informational assumptions,
however, are diﬀerent. In their model, all players are ex-ante symmetric. The individual coeﬃcients γi











Figure 5: The valuation for winning and cost of losing for player i with γi =1in a simple
contest with c(x)=x





.S i n c ec is strictly increasing
and players are ordered in decreasing order of reach, V1
γ1 ≥ ... ≥
VN
γN. The contest’s threshold





, so the range of scores over which players compete, [0,T],i s
independent of α. For Assumption B3 to hold, assume that
Vm+1
γm+1 is diﬀerent from
Vi
γi for
all i 6= m +1 . Theorem 1 then shows that the equilibrium payoﬀ of player i<m+1is












We therefore have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 In a simple contest, the payoﬀ of every player i<m+1is Vi −γi
Vm+1
γm+1.T h e
payoﬀs of players m +1 ,...,N are 0.P a y o ﬀsa r ei n d e p e n d e n to fα and c.
Corollary 1 shows that the payoﬀ of every player i<m+1increases in his valuation
f o rap r i z ea n di nt h em a r g i n a lp l a y e r ’ sc o s tc o e ﬃcient, and decreases in the player’s cost
coeﬃcient and in the marginal player’s valuation for a prize. In particular, the payoﬀ of
player i is not aﬀected by the characteristics of any player in N\{i,m +1 }.
Aggregate expenditures equal the allocation value of the prizes less players’ utilities.
We therefore obtain the following corollary of Theorem 1.
are privately known and drawn iid from a commonly known distribution. Moldovanu & Sela (2001) solve
for the symmetric equilibrium, and do not characterize all equilibria. In contrast, the model here is of
complete information and has a unique equilibrium.
















, and are independent of α and c.
Corollary 2 shows that when all valuations are equal, as is the case when prizes are
monetary, aggregate expenditures increase in valuations and in the cost coeﬃcients of
players 1,...,m, and decrease in the marginal player’s cost coeﬃcient.
4.1 Simple Contests with a Single Prize
Theorems 2 and 3 show that a simple contest with a single prize has a unique equilibrium,
described in Theorem 3. We therefore have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 A simple contest with a single prize has a unique equilibrium. In this equi-





















The corollary shows that the unique equilibrium is not independent of α and c.I t i s
straightforward to verify that player 1’s CDF ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)
that of player 2. Therefore, player 1 wins the prize with higher probability than player 2






∂α > 0 for all x in (0,T), so the equilibria for
lower values of α FOSD those of higher values of α: players tend to choose higher scores
as α decreases. It can also be shown that player 1’s probability of winning increases (and
that of player 2 decreases) as α decreases.
In the limit, as α approaches 0,p l a y e r1 chooses T with probability 1 and wins the




V1−γ1c(x). This is an equilibrium of the limit game in which every player i’s payoﬀ when
choosing si is 0 if he loses and Vi − γic(si) if he wins (see Section 4.2.1 below). A special
case is the complete-information ﬁrst-price auction.
4.2 Simple Contests with Multiple Prizes
From now on assume that c(·) is piecewise analytical. The following result is an immediate
corollary Theorems 8, since players m+2,...,ndo not participate in any equilibrium (the
conditions of Theorem 2 hold).
Corollary 4 A simple contest with multiple prizes has a unique equilibrium. In the unique
equilibrium, the strategies of players 1,...,m+1are given by the algorithm, and players
m +2 ,...,N choose 0 with certainty.
21Let ai =
γi
Vi, and note that ai is increasing in i. The following result shows that in the
unique equilibrium, the best response set of every player i ≤ m +1is an interval whose
upper bound is T and whose lower bound increases in the player’s reach (or, equivalently,
decreases in ai).







i ≥ 0, with sl
m = sl
m+1 =0 .F o ri,j ≤ m, sl
i ≤ sl
j if and
only if aj ≤ ai. Players m +2 ,...,N choose 0 with certainty.
Appendix C contains the proof of Theorem 9 and of other results in this section. The
outline of the proof is as follows. First, players with higher reach become active for the
ﬁrst time at higher scores. Second, semi-elasticities are increasing in reach at every score,
so when a player becomes active his semi-elasticity is higher than those of the other active
players. Thus, no active players become inactive as a result of a new player becoming
active.30 Third, the semi-elasticity of an active player never increases above the aggregate
hazard rate.31 T h i ss h o w st h a to n c eap l a y e rb e c o m e sa c t i v eh es t a y sa c t i v eu n t i lt h e




















































Figure 6: The unique equilibrium of a simple contest
A corollary of Theorem 9 and the fact that players’ semi-elasticities are increasing in
reach is that players’ equilibrium CDFs can be ranked in terms of FOSD.
30Contrast this with what happens in Figure 3 at the switching point x1: player 1 becomes active, and
because his semi-elasticity is suﬃciently lower than that of player 2, player 2 becomes inactive immediately
above x1.
31Contrast this with what happens in Figure 3 at the switching point x3: the hazard rate of player 3
drops to 0, so he becomes inactive immediately above x3.
22Corollary 5 For any α in (0,1] and i<j , the CDF of player i FOSD that of player j.
This implies that player i c h o o s e sh i g h e rs c o r e st h a np l a y e rj, on average, and also that
player i wins a prize with higher probability than player j.32
Using Theorem 9, I now derive an expression for players’ equilibrium strategies. Recall
that for any y<Tthe formula for player i’s CDF at y is given by Equation (3). Since
each player is active on an interval, D =1 , and the switching points are the points sl
i at
which players become active. Because players with higher reaches become active at higher








0 = T)a n dt h es e to fp l a y e r sa c t i v et ot h er i g h to fsl































1 − (1 − α)aic(x)


















We still have to identify the scores sl
i at which players become active. For simplicity
assume that the ais are distinct.33 Recall that sm = sm+1 =0 . The score sl
i at which
player i<mbecomes active is the lowest score x at which he obtains his power. That is,
sl





(1 − Gd (x))
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(1 − Gd (x))
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32In contrast to the two-player case, a player’s CDF for low values of α does not always FOSD his CDF
for high values of α.
33A similar analysis works when they are not distinct, but the notation becomes more cumbersome.
23After substituting Gd with the right-hand side of Equation (8) (with active players i +
1,...,m+1) and some algebraic manipulation, it can be shown that sl












k=i+1 (1 − akc(x)(1− α))
(1 − aic(x)(1− α))
m−i . (9)
Equation (9) characterizes sl
i implicitly, and provides a simple closed-form expression
for sl
i when α =1(see Section 4.2.2 below). It can also be used to show the following
result.
Theorem 10 For α<1 and i<m ,s l
i decreases in α.A sα approaches 0, sl
i approaches
T.
Theorem 10 has the following implication regarding the allocation of prizes. Call a
simple contest β-eﬃcient,f o rs o m eβ in (0,1),i fe a c ho ft h ep l a y e r s1,...,m(players with
positive power) obtains a prize with probability at least β in the unique equilibrium of the
contest.
Corollary 6 Choose a family of simple contests parameterized by α. For any β<1, every
simple contest in the family with a small enough α>0 is β-eﬃcient.
In particular, the corollary shows that when players diﬀer only in their valuations for a
prize, so that players 1,...,mare those with the highest valuations for a prize, allocative
eﬃciency of the prizes can be approached arbitrarily closely by reducing the unconditional
investment component α. The limiting equilibrium corresponding to α =0is eﬃcient (see
Section 4.2.1 below). Since players’ payoﬀsr e m a i nt h es a m ef o ra l lα>0 (Corollary 1),


















Although players’ individual expenditures and probabilities of winning, as well as ag-
gregate expenditures, change with α, a simple change-of-variable argument can be used to
show that they are independent of c.
4.2.1 The Case α =0
T h eg a m ew i t hα =0is not a contest, since Assumption B3 is violated. Instead, it is a
complete-information, discriminatory-price multiprize auction in which player i’s cost of
24bidding x is γic(x) if he wins and 0 if he loses. This game has many equilibria, some
of which involve players playing weakly-dominated strategies, and some of which rely on
speciﬁc tie-breaking rules. Diﬀerent equilibria lead to diﬀerent payoﬀs.34 Considering
the limit of the equilibria of simple contests as α approaches 0, we obtain the following
equilibrium of the game with α =0 .P l a y e r s 1,...,m− 1 bid T with probability 1.
Players m +2 ,...,n bid 0 with probability 1.P l a y e r sm and m +1bid the limit of the
equilibria of two-player simple contests as α approaches 0. As shown in Section 4.1, this





Vm−γmc(x) . In particular, only player m+1employs a mixed strategy. Players
1,...,mwin with certainty and players m+1,...,nlose with certainty. Players’ payoﬀsa r e
given by Theorem 1. Thus, taking the fraction of the all-pay component to 0 can serve as
a selection criterion that delivers a unique equilibrium of the limit game. This equilibrium
is robust to the tie-breaking rule, and is “close” to the equilibria of “nearby” contests
with a small all-pay component. A special case is the complete-information, pay-your-bid
multiprize auction.
4.2.2 The Case α =1

















































The special case of c(x)=x and γi =1is the multiprize all-pay auction, ﬁrst analyzed
by Clark & Riis (1998). Setting c(x)=x and γi =1in Equations (10) and (11) delivers
the equilibrium described in their Proposition 1.35 The analysis of Clark & Riis (1998)
34For example, a weak player could submit a bid whose cost exceeds his valuation for a prize, thereby
forcing a stronger player to submit a high bid. As long as the weak player loses for sure, he does not incur
any costs. This cannot happen under Assumption B3.
35Theorem 9 applied to multiprize all-pay auctions corrects two imprecisions in Clark & Riis (1998).
The ﬁrst is that they claimed uniqueness of equilibrium but provided an incorrect proof of this claim, as
25(page 279) provides a recursive closed-form formula for each player’s expenditures and
probability of winning, which are independent of c.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has investigated equilibrium behavior in a multiprize contest model featuring
asymmetric contestants and a combination of unconditional and conditional investments.
These features are common to many real-world competitions, and may lead to complicated
equilibrium behavior. I have solved for the unique equilibrium in two-player, single-prize
contests, and provided an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium within a large
class of multiprize contests. What matters for equilibrium uniqueness in a contest for m
prizes is that only the strongest m +1players participate, which is implied when weak
players are everywhere disadvantaged relative to the marginal player. Many existing models
of competition satisfy this condition.
As an application of the algorithm and the equilibrium uniqueness result, I investigated
the class of simple contests. Simple contests accommodate a limited degree of asymmetry
among players and both unconditional and conditional investments. Equilibrium behavior
in simple contests is relatively simple, since every player chooses a score from an interval.
This explains players’ behavior in the multiprize all-pay auction, which is a simple contest
in which all investments are unconditional and all costs are linear. When players diﬀer only
in their valuations for a prize, higher allocative eﬃciency can be achieved by reducing the
unconditional component of the investment. Doing so, however, increases aggregate ex-
penditures, since players’ payoﬀs are independent of the unconditional component. When
investments are wasteful, this implies a trade-oﬀ between increasing allocative eﬃciency,
which suggests decreasing the unconditional component, and decreasing aggregate expen-
ditures, which suggests increasing the unconditional component.
Classes of contests corresponding to real-world competitions can be studied using the
tools developed in this paper. Such studies can address various policy questions and issues
of contest design. The richness of the contest framework enhances the potential empirical
validity of such studies.
discussed in footnote 9 above. The second is that their footnote 6 claims that multiple equilibria arise
when two or more players have the same valuation. Theorem 9 shows that the equilibrium is unique even
if several players have the same valuation for a prize, as long as the valuation of the marginal player is
diﬀerent from those of the other players.
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28A A Non-Constructible Equilibrium36
The example depicts a separable contest with three players and one prize of common
value 1 (so vi (·)=1− ci (·)). I construct an equilibrium (C,G,G) of the contest, in
which player 1’s best-response set is the Cantor set. To deﬁne player 1’s cost function,
let c1 (x)=F (x)=x and modify F (x) by mimicking the construction of the Cantor
set on [0,1] in the following way. At every removed (a,b) and for every x ∈ (a,b),l e t
F(x)=a +
(x−a)2
b−a . Denote the resulting function by ˜ F.T h e n˜ F (0) = 0, ˜ F (1) = 1,a n d
˜ F is continuous, strictly increasing, equals x precisely on the Cantor set, and is strictly
lower than x on its complement. In particular, if player 1’s probability of winning when
playing x is ˜ F (x), then his best-response set is the Cantor set. To achieve this, let C be
the Cantor function, and recall that it is continuous and weakly increasing, with C (0) = 0




1 − ˜ F (x)
Then G(x) is continuous and strictly increasing, with G(0) = 0 and G(1) = 1.N o w ,
deﬁne player 2 and 3’s cost functions as
c2 (x)=c3 (x)=1− (1 − G(x))(1 − C (x)) = 1 −
µq
1 − ˜ F (x)
¶
(1 − C (x))
Then c2 and c3 are continuous and strictly increasing, with c2 (0) = c3 (0) = 0 and c2 (1) =
c3 (1) = 1. It is straightforward to verify that (C,G,G) is an equilibrium of the contest, in
which player 1’s best-response set is the Cantor set.
B P r o o f so ft h eR e s u l t so fS e c t i o n3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Since positive payoﬀs imply winning with positive probability at every best response, the
Tie Lemma in Siegel (2009) shows that players in 1,...,md on o th a v ea na t o ma t0.S i n c e
there are no atoms above 0 and every x>0 is a best response of at least two players
(Lemma 2), Gm+1 (0) ≥ mini≤m
wi
vi(0). Since no player should be able to obtain more than
his power by choosing a score slightly above 0, Gm+1 (0) ≤ mini≤m
wi
vi(0). Strictly decreasing
valuations for winning also imply that wi = vi (T) <v i (0),s oGm+1 (0) < 1.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Choose y ∈ (x, ¯ x),a n dl e tpi (y)=1− Gi (y).S i n c e qi (y) > 0 and pi (y),D > 0 (all
players choose scores up to the threshold by the Threshold Lemma of Siegel (2009) and
36I thank George Mailath for encouraging me to provide this example.
29strictly decreasing valuations for winning), Equation (2) for i ∈ A+ (x) can be rewritten
as Πj∈A+(x)\{i}pj (y)=
qi(y)
D > 0. Taking natural logs,
X
j∈A+(x)\{i}
lnpj (y)=l nqi (y) − lnD.
This is a system of |A+ (x)| linear equations in |A+ (x)| unknowns pj (y).D e n o t eb yIM×M
and 1M×M the identity matrix and a matrix of ones, respectively, of dimensions M × M.




lnp(y)=l nq(y) − lnD




M−1 · 1M×M − IM×M
¢
,w eh a v e
lnpi (y)=
1
|A+ (x)| − 1
X
j∈A+(x)
lnqj (y) − lnqi (y) −
1
|A+ (x)| − 1
lnD
which gives the result for y ∈ (x, ¯ x).F o r y ∈ {x, ¯ x},¯ x 6= T, the result follows from left-
and right-continuity on [0,T).A n dG(T)=1because by part (3) of Lemma 2 no player
has best responses above T.
B.3 Statement and Proof of Lemma 7






max{H − εj (y),0},
and denote by HB (y) t h eu n i q u ep o s i t i v eﬁxed point of SB
y .N o t et h a tSx (·)=S
A(x)
x (·)
and H (x)=HA(x) (x). The following lemma characterizes A+ (x).
Lemma 7 A+ (x) is exactly all players i ∈ A(x) with εi (y) ≤ HA(x) (y) on some right-
neighborhood of x.37
I ﬁrst establish that the set of players described in the lemma is well deﬁned. For
this, I show that HA(x) (y) on some right-neighborhood of x can be computed as follows.
37A+ (x) can also be constructed as follows. Order the players in A(x) in any non-decreasing order of
semi-elasticity on some right-neighborhood of x. A+ (x) is the subset {1,...,L(x)} ⊆ A(x),w h e r eL(x)





εj (y) − εl (y) ≥ 0
on this right-neighborhood of x. This follows from solving the system of Equations (5) and using the
arguments in the proof of Lemma 7.
30Order the players in A(x) in any non-decreasing order of semi-elasticity on some right-
neighborhood of x (this can be done since semi-elasticities are analytical on some right-
neighborhood of x, and an analytical function with an accumulation point of roots is
identically 0 in the connected component of the accumulation point). Let L(x) be the





εj (y) − εl (y) ≥ 0









on this right-neighborhood of x. This follows from the uniqueness of the ﬁxed point of
S
A(x)
y (y).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,HA(x) is analytical on this right-neighborhood of x.
Therefore, for every player i ∈ A(x) and all scores y slightly above x, either (i) εi (y) <
HA(x) (y), (ii) εi (y) >H A(x) (y), or (iii) εi (y)=HA(x) (y). To determine which of these
obtains for player i ∈ A(x), consider the lowest k ≥ 0 such that the kth derivative of εi (x)−
HA(x) (x) is diﬀerent from 0 (by analyticity this expression is inﬁnitely diﬀerentiable). If
this kth derivative is negative, then (i) obtains; if the derivative is positive, then (ii) obtains;
if all derivatives are 0, then (iii) obtains (by analyticity). This is the method described in
Section 3, since H (x)=HA(x) (x).
It remains to show that A+ (x) is exactly the set of players described by the lemma.
For this, note that the aggregate hazard rate H (y)=HA+(x) (y) at scores y slightly above
x is bounded from below by HA(x) (y),s i n c eA+ (y) ⊆ A(x) and increasing the set of
players with respect to which the supply function is calculated can only lower the ﬁxed
point. Therefore, if (i) or (iii) obtain for player i ∈ A(x) then εi (y) ≤ HA(x) (y) ≤ H (y)
so i ∈ A+ (x). Suppose that (ii) obtains but i ∈ A+ (x). This means that HA(x) (y) <
εi (y) ≤ H (y) for all y slightly above x. Therefore, there is a player j ∈ A(x)\A+ (x) with
εj (y) <ε i (y) for all y slightly above x.38 But player j is getting more than his power
slightly above x,s i n c eεj (y) <ε i (y) ≤ H (y) for all y slightly above x.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 8 ∀˜ x<T, the number of switching points in [0, ˜ x] is ﬁnite.
Proof. I assume analytical valuations for winning and costs of losing (the obvious extension
applies to piecewise analyticity). Choose ˜ x<Tand rank players’ semi-elasticities at every
38Players j with εj (y) ≥ εi (y) for all y slightly above x do not aﬀect whether HA(x) (y) is higher or
lower than εi (y),s oi fa l lp l a y e r sj ∈ A(x) with εj (y) <ε i (y) for all y slightly above x were in A+ (x),
then εi (y) ≤ HA
+(x) (y) would mean that εi (y) ≤ HA(x) (y).
31score in [0, ˜ x]. Since semi-elasticities are analytical, this ranking can change only ﬁnitely
many times. Thus, [0, ˜ x] can be divided into a ﬁnite number of intervals such that the
ranking of players’ semi-elasticities is constant on each interval. Fix one such interval J.
For every subset B ⊆ N of at least two players and every x ∈ J,d e n o t eb ytB (x) the
highest semi-elasticity of a player who can join the set of active players B and maintain
a non-negative hazard rate: tB (x)= 1
|B|−1
P
j∈B εj (x) (the aggregate hazard rates of
players in B). Since semi-elasticities are analytical, so is tB (·). Thus, the interval J can
be divided into a ﬁnite number of subintervals such on every subinterval each function
in {εi − tB : i ∈ N,B ⊆ N,|B| ≥ 2} is either positive, negative, or 0.C l e a r l y ,o na n ys u c h
subinterval L ⊆ J an active player can become inactive only if a player with a strictly lower
semi-elasticity becomes active (recall that the order of players’ semi-elasticities doesn’t
change on J). Now, suppose in contradiction that the number of switching points in L is
inﬁnite. This implies that some player i becomes inactive and active an inﬁnite number of
times, which, by the above, implies that some player j with semi-elasticity strictly lower
than that of i becomes inactive and active an inﬁnite number of times. Continuing in this
way, we obtain a contradiction since the number of players is ﬁnite.
The following two lemmas show that there are no switching points in some left-neighborhood
of T.
Lemma 9 ∃˜ x<T such that ∀i ∈ N : εi (x) <H(x) for every x ∈ (˜ x,T).
































where the penultimate equality follows from l’Hopital’s rule.
Let εmin (x)=m i n i∈N εi (x) for x<T. Then, by the above, limx→T
εi(x)




n−1 for all x>˜ x for some ˜ x suﬃciently close to T. To conclude, it suﬃces to show
that ∀x>˜ x : H (x) ≥ n
n−1εmin (x).L e t Smin
x (H)=nmax{H − εmin (x),0}.T h e n
∀H : Sx (H) ≤ Smin
x (H) and since n
n−1εmin (x) is the unique positive ﬁxed point of Smin
x ,
H (x) ≥ n
n−1εmin (x).
Since active players with semi-elasticities strictly lower than the aggregate hazard rate
remain active, in order to complete the proof it suﬃces to show the following.
Lemma 10 Every player i has scores x arbitrarily close to T such that qi (x)=Πj6=i (1 − Gj (x)).
Proof. Suppose, in contradiction, that ∀x ∈ (˜ xi,T):qi (x) < Πj6=i (1 − Gj (x)) for some
player i and some ˜ xi > ˜ x of the previous lemma. Then, f (x)=
P
j6=i ln(1 − Gj (x)) −
lnqi (x) > 0.S i n c ei/ ∈ A(x),
∀x ∈ (˜ xi,T):H (x)=
|A+ (x)|














(1 − Gi (x))
32Thus,
f
0 (x)=εi (x) −
|A+ (x)|
|A+ (x)| − 1
X
j∈A+(x)




















(lnqmin (z) − lnqmin (x)) = −∞
f crosses 0 at a score in (˜ xi T), a contradiction.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 6
By Lemma 5, ∃˜ x<Tsuch that ∀x ∈ (˜ x,T),A(x)=N. Equation (3) now implies that





lnqj (x) − lnqi (x)
To show that Gi (x) →
x→T





lnqj (x) − lnqi (x) →
x→T
−∞
Since lnqi (x) →
x→T






> 1+δ for some δ>0
for large enough x. The inequality follows from l’Hopital’s rule and the fact that limx→T
εi(x)
εj(x) =
1, shown in the proof of Lemma 5.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose that the contest has a constructible equilibrium G. For expositional simplicity,
I assume that the number of switching points in G is ﬁnite. It is straightforward to
accommodate a countably inﬁnite number of switching points by deﬁning the limit of a
sequence of switching points to be a switching point and modifying the proof appropriately.
In the following propositions, xk denotes switching point k in G. The last switching
point is T. A(x) and A+ (x) are deﬁned as in Section 3. Choose any equilibrium ˜ G of the
contest, and recall that ˜ G is continuous above 0 (part (1) of Lemma 2). ˜ A(x) denotes the
set of players active at x under ˜ G, i.e., the set of players deﬁn e db yE q u a t i o n( 4 )w i t h ˜ G
instead of G.U s i n gA+ (x),Iw i l ls h o wt h a tA(x)= ˜ A(x) for all x ∈ [0,T]. The following
lemma shows that doing so is suﬃcient.
33Lemma 11 Let ˜ x ∈ [0,T].I f∀x ∈ [0, ˜ x]: ˜ A(x)=A(x),t h e n∀x ∈ [0, ˜ x]: ˜ G(x)=G(x).
Proof. Denote by ¯ x the inﬁmum of the scores on which ˜ G diﬀers from G.S i n c e˜ G(0) =
G(0) (Lemma 3 does not rely on analyticity), G and ˜ G are continuous on (0,T) (part (1)
Lemma 2), and ˜ G(T)=G(T)=1(part (3) of Lemma 2), we have ˜ G(¯ x)=G(¯ x).I f
¯ x<˜ x, then by constructibility of G and because ∀x ∈ [0, ˜ x]: ˜ A(x)=A(x), the algorithm
shows that ˜ G(x)=G(x) on a right-neighborhood of ¯ x, a contradiction. Thus, ¯ x =˜ x.
Now, let xk be the highest positive switching point such that ˜ A(x)=A(x) on [0,x k],
and suppose in contradiction that xk <T.C h o o s ex ∈ (xk,x k+1) such that ˜ A(x) 6= A(x).
Since xk <T ,s u c ha nx exists otherwise Lemma 11 and continuity would imply that
˜ A(xk+1)=A(xk+1). The following lemmas show that ˜ A(x) ⊆ A(x) and A(x) ⊆ ˜ A(x),
which completes the proof.
Lemma 12 ˜ A(x) ⊆ A(x).
Proof. Suppose ˜ A(x) 6⊆ A(x),a n dl e ti0 ∈ ˜ A(x)\A(x).S i n c ei0 / ∈ A(x),w eh a v e
wi0 + ci0 (y)
vi0 (y)+ci0 (y)
>P i0 (x)=1− Πj6=i0 (1 − Gj (x))
or
vi0 (y) − wi0
vi0 (y)+ci0 (y)
< Πj6=i0 (1 − Gj (x))
and since i0 ∈ ˜ A(x),w eh a v e









1 − ˜ Gj (x)
´
< Πj6=i0 (1 − Gj (x))
Let J1 = N\{i0}.T h e n
Πj∈J1
³
1 − ˜ Gj (x)
´
< Πj∈J1 (1 − Gj (x)) (12)
By the Threshold Lemma of Siegel (2009), the expression on each side of Inequality (12) is




1 − ˜ Gj (x)
´
< ΠJ1\{i1} (1 − Gj (x)) (13)
(otherwise multiplying the products of all subsets of size n−2 for G and for ˜ G would lead
to a contradiction).




1 − ˜ Gi (x)
´
≤ (1 − Gi (x)) (14)
34Let K1 = N\J1 = {i0}.S i n c eA+ (x) ⊆ A(x) and i0 / ∈ A(x),b yI n e q u a l i t y( 1 4 )
³
1 − ˜ Gj∈K1 (x)
´
≤ (1 − Gj∈K1 (x)) (15)
By Inequalities (13) and (15),
Πj∈J1∪K1\{i1}
³
1 − ˜ Gj (x)
´
< Πj∈J1∪K1\{i1} (1 − Gj (x)) (16)
Since N = J1 ∪ K1, Inequality (16) shows that i1 / ∈ A+ (xk), otherwise i1 would obtain
under ˜ G more than his power by choosing x.
Now repeat the process above, letting Jr+1 = Jr\{ir},K r+1 = Kr ∪ {ir}. By induction
on r, Inequalities (12),(13),(15), and (16) hold with Jr instead of J1,K r instead of K1,
and ik instead of i1,s oKr ∩ A+ (xk)=φ. A contradiction is reached at stage n − 1,s i n c e
|Kn−1| = N − 1 but |A+ (xk)| ≥ 2.
Corollary 7 ∀j/ ∈ A(x),∀y ∈ (xk,x k+1): ˜ Gj (y)=Gj (y)=G(xk).
Proof. Immediate from ˜ A(y) ⊆ A(y) applied to all points y ∈ (xk,x k+1).
The next two lemmas establish that A(x) ⊆ ˜ A(x).
Lemma 13 If A(x) 6⊆ ˜ A(x),t h e n ˜ Gi (x) >G i (x) for some i ∈ A(x)\ ˜ A(x).
Proof. Let B = A(x)\ ˜ A(x), and suppose that ∀j ∈ B : ˜ Gj (x) ≤ Gj (x). This implies
that ∃j ∈ B : ˜ Gj (x) <G j (x). Indeed, by Corollary 7 and Equation (3) with ˜ A(x) instead
of A+ (x) and x instead of y,o n c eG and ˜ G agree on (N/A(x)) ∪ B = N/ ˜ A(x) we obtain
˜ G(x)=G(x) and therefore A(x)= ˜ A(x).
To show that ∃i ∈ B such that ˜ Gi (x) >G i (x), the following observation is required. Fix
some values ¯ Gj (x) for j/ ∈ A(x) and use Equation (3) to solve for the values ¯ Gl (x),l ∈
A(x). Maintaining the value ¯ Gl (x) for player l ∈ A(x) and solving for A(x)\{l} using
Equation (3) gives the same solutions. If we now lower ¯ Gl (x) and solve for A(x)\{l},
then the values ¯ Gj (x) of all players j ∈ A(x)\{l} strictly increase (this is easily seen from
Equation (3), since D increases). Observe also that setting ¯ Gj (x)= ˜ Gj (x) for j/ ∈ ˜ A(x)
and solving for the values ¯ Gi (x),i∈ ˜ A(x) using Equation (3) with ˜ A(x) instead of A(x)
gives ¯ G(x)= ˜ G(x).
Now, consider the following process by which ˜ G(x) is “reached” from G(x).S e t¯ Gl (x)
equal to Gl (x)= ˜ Gl (x) for l/ ∈ A(x).T a k e a p l a y e r j ∈ B for whom ˜ Gj (x) <G j (x).
Then, solving for A(x)\{j} using ¯ Gj (x)=Gj (x) as described above and then lowering
¯ Gj (x) to ˜ Gj (x) and solving again for A(x)\{j}, raises the solutions above Gl (x) for all
l ∈ A(x)\{j}.T h u s ,i fB = {j} then A(x)\{j} = ˜ A(x) and ¯ Gl (x)= ˜ Gl (x),l / ∈ ˜ A(x),
so the solutions for ¯ Gi,i ∈ ˜ A(x) coincide with ˜ G and player j obtains under ˜ G at x
more than his power (since under G at x player j ∈ A(x) obtains precisely his power).
If B 6= {j}, continue this process: take a player l ∈ B\{j} and lower ¯ Gl (x) obtained
35in the previous step to ˜ Gl (x);39 solve for A(x)\{j,l}, and remember that after lowering
¯ Gj (x) from Gj (x) to ˜ Gj (x) all players in A(x)\{j} obtained precisely their power, and
l ∈ A(x)\{j}.S i n c e¯ Gl (x) decreases to ˜ Gl (x), the solutions for all players in A(x)\{j,l}
strictly increase and ˜ Gj (x) does not change, so player l now obtains more than his payoﬀ.
Continuing in this way and recalling that ¯ G = ˜ G once ¯ G and ˜ G agree on N/ ˜ A(x),w e
see that the last player in B obtains more than his power under ˜ G at x, a contradiction.
Therefore, ˜ Gi (x) >G i (x) for some player i ∈ B.
Lemma 14 A(x) ⊆ ˜ A(x).
Proof. Suppose A(x) 6⊆ ˜ A(x). By the previous lemma, ˜ Gi (x) >G i (x) for some i ∈
A(x)\ ˜ A(x).S i n c e˜ Gi (xk)=Gi (xk), ˜ Gi (y) >G i (y) for some y ∈ (xk,x) such that
i ∈ ˜ A(y).40 This means that ˜ A(y) 6= A(y) (otherwise Corollary 7 and Equation (3) would
imply ˜ Gi (y)=Gi (y)). Let ˆ B = A(y)\ ˜ A(y).
Now perform a procedure similar to the one described in the previous lemma, reaching
˜ G(y) from G(y). Begin with players l ∈ ˆ B for whom ˜ Gl (y) >G l (y).R a i s i n g¯ Gl (y) from
Gl (y) to ˜ Gl (y) decreases the solutions for all other players, so the order of raising does
not matter - the solutions must be raised for all players l ∈ ˆ B for whom ˜ Gl (y) >G l (y).
If the solutions of any remaining players in ˆ B now need to be raised to reach their level in
˜ G, continue the raising process until no more players in ˆ B need their solutions raised. It
cannot be that ˆ B is exhausted, since ˜ Gi (y) >G i (y) and so far the solutions of all players
in ˜ A(y) have been repeatedly decreased, starting from their level in G. Thus, there remains
an o n - e m p t ys e t ¯ B ⊆ ˆ B of players whose solutions must now be decreased to reach their
level in ˜ G. Decreasing these solutions increases the solutions for all other players. By the
argument used in the previous lemma, the last player whose solution is decreased receives
too high a payoﬀ under ˜ G at y.
B.7 The Example of Section 3







100 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.31948
x
100 +1 .0581(x − (0.31948))
2 if 0.31948 <x≤ 1
0.5+1 .45(x − 1) if 1 <x
39Since ˜ Gl (x) ≤ Gl (x) and lowering ¯ Gj (x) from Gj (x) to ˜ Gj (x) raised the solutions ¯ Gl (x) for all
l ∈ A(x)\{j},w eh a v e ˜ Gl (x) < ¯ Gl (x).
40Let ¯ z =s u p z∈[xk,x)
n
˜ Gi (z)=Gi (z)
o
.B yc o n t i n u i t yo f ˜ Gi and Gi, ¯ z<x . If for all y ∈ (¯ z,x) we had




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
x
12 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.31948
x
12 +1 .9794(x − (0.31948))
2 if 0.31948 <x≤ 0.7259
0.38744 + 1.6923(x − 0.7259) + 25(x − 0.7259)
2 if 0.7259 <x≤ 0.85
0.98247 +
(1−0.98247)
0.15 (x − 0.85) if 0.85 <x
These cost functions give powers of 0, 1
4 and 1
2. Perturbing the cost functions slightly
does not change the qualitative aspects of the equilibrium.
C P r o o f so ft h eR e s u l t so fS e c t i o n4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 9
That players m +2 ,...,N do not participate was shown in Corollary 4. Denote by sl
i
the lowest score at which player i is active. Because m,m +1∈ A(0) (see point 4 in
Section 3.2), we have sl
m = sl
m+1 =0 .N o w , s u p p o s e t h a t f o r i,j ≤ m, sl
i ≤ sl
j.S i n c e















































































































































































Vi =1− aic(T) and
wj

























































i =0 , we consider the limit of the probabilities of winning as the score approaches 0 from above,









































<c(T),t h i si m p l i e st h a taj ≤ ai.
It remains to show that if a player becomes active at some score, then he remains active
until the threshold. To do this, let us derive some properties of player’s semi-elasticities.
We must ﬁrst normalize players’ payoﬀs so that the prize value is 1 for all players. To this
end, note that the contest is strategically equivalent to a contest in which all valuations
equal 1 and in which player i’s cost is aic instead of γic.W et h e nh a v e
qi (x)=















c0 (x)(ai (α − 1) + am+1)
(1 − c(x)am+1)(aic(x)(α − 1) + 1)
.





(aic(x)(α − 1) + 1)
2 ≤ 0
so at every score players with a higher reach have higher semi-elasticities. This means
that when a new player becomes active all existing active players remain active, and that
whether an active player remains active depends only on his semi-elasticity and those of
players with lower reaches. In particular, players m and m +1are always active, since
their semi-elasticities are always the lowest. To show that players 1,...,m− 1 are active







(aj (α − 1) + am+1)(aic(x)(α − 1) + 1)
(ai (α − 1) + am+1)(ajc(x)(α − 1) + 1)
¶0
=
am+1 − (1 − α)aj
am+1 − (1 − α)ai
(1 − α)(aj − ai)c0 (x)
(ajc(x)(α − 1) + 1)
2 ≥ 0
and also that this ratio is at most 1 (since players with a higher reach have higher semi-
elasticities). Suppose in contradiction that there is a player who is not active on an interval,
and let i ≤ m − 1 be the player with the highest index among such players. Suppose that
player i is active at si.D e n o t eb yHi+1,...,m+1 (·) the ﬁxed point of the “supply function”
deﬁned using the semi-elasticities of players i+1,...,m+1, and consider a score s0
i ∈ [si,T].
By deﬁnition of player i and because players with higher reaches become active at higher
scores, players m +1 ,...,i+1are active at s0
i. So, because the semi-elasticities of all
players 1,...,i− 1 are weakly higher than that of player i, εi (s0
i) ≤ H (s0
i) if and only
38if εi (s0
i) ≤ Hi+1,...,m+1 (s0
i).L e t b =
εi(s0
i)






























Because player i is active at si, εi (si) ≤ H (si) so εi (si) ≤ Hi+1,...,m+1 (si).T h e r e f o r e ,
εi (s0
i)=bεi (si) ≤ bHi+1,...,m+1 (si) ≤ Hi+1,...,m+1 (s0
i) so εi (s0
i) ≤ H (s0
i).T h i ss h o w st h a t
once a player becomes active he remains active until the threshold.
C.2 Proof of Corollary 5
First, sl
j ≤ sl
i,s oGi (x) ≤ Gj (x) for any x ≤ sl

















.S o i starts dropping out later
and drops out more slowly than j,w h i c hm e a n st h a tGi FOSD Gj. To see this, recall
that hi (x)=−
(1−Gi(x))0
















(1 − Gi (x))
0
1 − Gi (x)
−
(1 − Gj (x))
0




1 − Gi (x)








1 − Gi (y)






























i) > 1, so by taking exponents the previous
inequality implies
1−Gi(y)
1−Gj(y) ≥ 1,o rGj (y) ≥ Gi (y), as required.
This FOSD implies that probability of winning is higher than that of player j for any
given score, and hence also in expectation. To see this, note that by choosing x>0 i
beats j with probability Gj (x), whereas by choosing xjbeats i with probability Gi (x).
Therefore, because Gj (x) ≥ Gi (x), for any given score i wins with at least as high a




Pj (x)dGi,a n d




Pj (x)dGj = Pj.







k=i+1 (1 − akc(x)(1− α))
(1 − aic(x)(1− α))
m−i ,
and note that f is diﬀerentiable in α<1 and x<T.D e n o t eb ysl











> 1 (because ak increases in k)a n df (α,0) = 1

















, the intermediate value
theorem shows that sl
i (α0) <s l
i (α). Therefore, to show that sl
i decreases in α it suﬃces to
show that
∂f(a,x)







k∈{i+1,...,m+1}\j (1 − akc(x)(1− α))
´
(1 − am+1c(x))(1 − aic(x)(1− α))
m−i
³






k=i+1 (1 − akc(x)(1− α))
³




(1 − am+1c(x))(1 − aic(x)(1− α))
m−i
´2 ,








(1 − akc(x)(1− α))
⎞
⎠(1 − aic(x)(1− α)) >
Π
m+1
k=i+1 (1 − akc(x)(1− α))((m − i)aic(x)).
For this inequality to hold, it suﬃces that for every j = i +1 ,...m+1 ,
ajc(x) >a ic(x) and 1 − aic(x)(1− α) > 1 − ajc(x)(1− α),
and this holds since ak increases in k. Therefore sl
i decrease in α<1 for every player
i =1 ,...,m− 1.
Now consider what happens to sl










k=i+1 (1 − akc(x))
(1 − aic(x))
m−i ≤ 1.
Therefore, by uniform continuity of f (α,x) on [0, ˜ α] × [0,x] for any ˜ α ∈ (0,1), sl
i must
approach T as α approaches 0.
C.4 Proof of Corollary 6
Choose β<1. By Theorem 10 there exist ˜ x<Tand ˜ α>0 such that for all α<˜ α and
i<m , sl





Vm−(1−α)γmc(˜ x) >βand (2)
αγm+1c(˜ x)
Vm+1−(1−α)γm+1c(˜ x) < 1 − β. Consider the unique equilibrium G of a such a simple contest
with α<˜ α.S i n c e Gi (˜ x)=0for i =1 ,...,m− 1 and Gi (0) = 1 for i = m +2 ,...,n,
Corollary 3 shows that the CDFs of players m +1and m on [0, ˜ x] are given by (1) and
(2). Since sl
i > ˜ x for i =1 ,...,m−1, each of these m−1 players beats player m+1,a n d
therefore wins a prize, with probability of at least β.P l a y e rm chooses scores higher than
˜ x with probability of at least β, and therefore wins a prize with probability of at least β
2.
40